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Abstract: This paper challenges the common assumption that some phenotypic traits are 
quantitative while others are qualitative. The distinction between these two kinds of traits 
is widely influential in biological and biomedical research as well as in scientific education 
and communication. This is probably due to both historical and epistemological reasons. 
However, the quantitative/qualitative distinction involves a variety of simplifications on the 
genetic causes of phenotypic variability and on the development of complex traits. Here, I 
examine three cases from the life sciences that show inconsistencies in the distinction: Men-
delian traits (dwarfism and pigmentation in plant and animal models), Mendelian diseases 
(phenylketonuria), and polygenic mental disorders (schizophrenia). I show that these traits 
can be framed both quantitatively and qualitatively depending, for instance, on the methods 
through which they are investigated and on specific epistemic purposes (e.g., clinical diag-
nosis versus causal explanation). This suggests that the received view of quantitative and 
qualitative traits has a limited heuristic power—limited to some local contexts or to the 
specific methodologies adopted. Throughout the paper, I provide directions for framing 
phenotypes beyond the quantitative/qualitative distinction. I conclude by pointing at the 
necessity of developing a principled characterisation of what phenotypic traits, in general, 
are. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Genetics textbooks often draw a distinction between two types of phenotypic traits: 
on the one hand, quantitative traits, also labelled as ‘complex’ or ‘polygenic,’ among 
which height, skin colour, and intelligence are three renowned examples; on the 
other hand, qualitative traits, often described as ‘simple’ or ‘monogenic,’ among 
which prominent examples are pea seeds colour and Mendelian diseases. 
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative traits is influential in sci-
entific education, communication, and research across biological and biomedical 
sciences. This popularity is probably due to both historical and epistemological rea-
sons. From a historical point of view, the distinction relates to the classical separa-
tion of biometrical and Mendelian theories of heredity, which strongly resonates in 
contemporary scientific practices. In epistemological terms, instead, the concepts of 
quantitative and qualitative traits seem to be understood as conceptually clear de-
scriptions of phenotypes with a great heuristic and methodological potential. In this 
sense, the two concepts seem to be consistently associated, respectively, with a vari-
ety of aspects of organismal biology and its study, including: continuous and discon-
tinuous phenotypic variations; polygenic and monogenic inheritance patterns; com-
plex and simple genotype-phenotype (G-P) maps; quantitative and qualitative meth-
odologies. 
In this paper, I challenge the assumption that the quant/qual distinction is, in 
fact, consistent, which is the basis to think that it can serve as a useful heuristic for 
biological and biomedical research. I discuss specific cases from Mendelian, biomed-
ical, and behavioural genetics that illustrate inconsistencies in the distinction and 
its applications. Thus, I provide directions for framing phenotypic traits alterna-
tively. Here below is the structure of the paper. 
In Section 2, I outline the received view of quantitative and qualitative traits as 
typically described in genetics textbooks and discuss some possible reasons of the 
popularity of the distinction in genetics research. 
In Section 3, I analyse qualitative traits by focusing on three Mendelian traits: 
dwarfism, pigmentation, and phenylketonuria. Through the analysis of these cases, 
I show that the concept of qualitative traits leads researchers to take the association 
between single-gene variations and phenotypic variations as the basis for a defini-
tional approach of phenotypes. Notably, this approach represents a major source of 
misconceptions of genetics findings among non-specialists. In order to illustrate 
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misunderstandings connected with the notion of qualitative trait, I shall consider 
(an adapted version of) the distinction between characters and characters states. 
In Section 4, I turn to the concept of quantitative traits by examining the case of 
mental disorders—in particular, schizophrenia—which can be framed either quali-
tatively or quantitatively depending on the theoretical model assumed: the quanti-
tative-liability model is an attempt to fit schizophrenia in the standard definition of 
quantitative trait; by contrast, the threshold model frames schizophrenia through a 
mixed qualitative-quantitative conceptual strategy. I argue that the purely quantita-
tive characterisation of schizophrenia is afflicted by remarkable theoretical difficul-
ties (the distinction between characters and character states will be of central im-
portance here, too). Thus, I turn to the threshold model as a plausible way out from 
the quant/qual distinction in the psychiatric context. Before concluding, I will out-
line what conceptual tools the concept of threshold could introduce, more generally, 
in the analysis of complex traits. 
In conclusion, I highlight that the problems identified throughout the paper are 
conceptual in nature and concern the way we think of the relationship between the 
genotype and the phenotype. This points at the necessity to provide a principled 
characterisation of what phenotypic traits, in general, are. 
 
 
2. The Received View of Quantitative and Qualitative Traits 
 
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative traits dates back to the early 
twentieth century, when scholars were working to establish the basis of modern ge-
netics. Back then, researchers mostly framed phenotypes according to two general 
approaches, namely, biometrics and Mendelism, which were concerned with the 
study of quantitative and qualitative inheritance, respectively. The biometrical ap-
proach originated from the late work of Francis Galton (e.g., 1894) and was charac-
terised by the study of heredity through statistical methods—e.g., the analysis of 
correlations among relatives—developed by Galton himself and his intellectual de-
scendants, e.g., Pearson, Weldon, and Yule. The Mendelian approach to heredity, in 
turn, was largely based on the analysis of pure lines developed by Gregor Mendel 
(1866) and the following Mendelians, e.g., Bateson, DeVries, Johannsen, and Punnet 
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(see Griffiths & Stotz, 2013; Norton, 1975; Provine, 1971; Schwartz, 2009; Visscher 
& Goddard, 2018).1 
The work of biometricians was mostly focused on traits that vary continuously 
in populations such as height, skin colour, and intelligence. For these traits, all values 
or gradations within a certain range can be observed (Mather, 1941, p. 160). For 
instance, different values of height or different scores in Intelligent Quotient (IQ) 
tests can be ordered on a single dimension so that phenotypes gradually ‘shade’ one 
into the other—to put it simply, it makes little sense to say that there are just ‘tall’ 
and ‘short’ people. 
Ever since the biometrical school identified nature and nurture as the two main 
sources of variation in quantitative traits, scholars assumed that the development 
of these traits is due to many factors, including several independent genes (up to 
hundreds or thousands, that additively influence the phenotype) and environmental 
influences. The involvement of many genetic and environmental effects of small 
magnitude would explain why phenotypes vary continuously in populations (see 
Fisher, 1918; Fisher et al., 1932; Dobzhansky, 1970; Mather, 1941, 1943, 1964). 
Notably, according to the polygenic model, no gene in a polygenic system is in-
dividually necessary. So, two individuals can have the same phenotype with differ-
ent allelic makeups (Pierce, 2017). For instance, two individuals can be equally tall 
(e.g., 168 cm) due to different allelic combinations. This is well expressed by the fol-
lowing mathematical description, which, for the sake of simplicity, considers the 
genotype at just three loci: 
 
“With only three polygenes of equal effect, the genotypes AABBcc, AAbbCC and aaBBCC will, for ex-
ample, give the same phenotype. This phenotype would also characterize the genotypes AaBBcc, 
AABbcc, AaBbcc, etc., if dominance were the rule, or AABbCc, AaBBCc, and AaBbCC in the absence of 
dominance. […] The allelomorphs designated by small letters are assumed to add nothing to the ex-
pression of the character, while each allelomorph designated by a capital letter adds 1 unit. […] As 
the number of genes involved increases, more phenotypes are possible, and the distribution becomes 
more nearly continuous […] as observed, for example, in human stature” (Mather, 1943, pp. 39-40).2 
 
Due to the small individual effect of each allele, the action of genes on quantita-
tive traits is to be studied en masse via statistical methods (Griffing, 1950, p. 303). 
 
1 This standard reconstruction is, however, historically inaccurate (see Footnote #8). 
2 Note that this idealised explanation represents a standard one in quantitative genetics (e.g., Pierce, 2017; 
Purcell, 2013). 
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Thus, the study of these traits has mostly involved the variance-partitioning ap-
proach and heritability analyses, thanks to which researchers have investigated the 
relative magnitude of genetic and environmental influences on a trait’s variation 
(see Downes & Matthews, 2019; Visscher et al., 2008).3 More recently, genome-wide 
association studies (GWAS) have allowed identifying the statistical association be-
tween genotypic and phenotypic variation in quantitative traits (see Downes & Mat-
thews, 2019; Eley & Rijsdijk, 2005). 
Let us now turn to qualitative traits. These traits are often called ‘binary’, 
‘yes/no’, or ‘either-or’ traits because they fit into discrete categories, e.g., the yellow 
or green colour of pea seeds (Falconer & MacKay, 1996; Knopik et al., 2017; Pierce, 
2017; Plomin et al., 2013; Purcell, 2013). Traits of this sort are often regarded as 
controlled by single genes (Ahluwalia, 2009).4 Rare human pathologies such as phe-
nylketonuria, Huntington Chorea, and cystic fibrosis are famous for being associated 
with single genetic variants and, thus, are usually called Mendelian diseases.5 
On the methodological side, molecular methods such as the candidate-gene ap-
proach derive from this classical Mendelian framework. The assumption, here, is 
that it is promising to seek the specific genes causing qualitative traits (or single 
alleles associated with a trait’s variation) because their individual effect is apprecia-
ble at the phenotypic level—technically, such genes are highly penetrant on the phe-
notype. Due to the strong penetrance of single genetic variants in qualitative traits, 
the importance of environmental factors on these traits is thought to be small: 
 
“Genes can influence phenotypes through major biochemical pathways [strong genetic explanations]. 
This is the case with monogenic diseases and conditions that involve a small number of genes” (Dar-
Nimrod & Heine, 2011, p. 5). 
 
“[In] the traits that Mendel studied, as well as [in] Huntington disease and PKU, […] a single gene is 
necessary and sufficient to cause the disorder. That is, you will have Huntington disease only if you 
have the H allele (necessary); if you have the H allele, you will have Huntington disease (sufficient). 
Other genes and environmental factors have little effect on its inheritance” (Knopik et al., 2017, p. 32; 
see also Plomin et al., 2013, p. 32, pp. 94-95). 
 
3 For some critical discussions on nature/nurture and heritability analyses, see Block (1995); Lewontin 
(1974); Tabery (2014). 
4 Mather (1941, 1943) originally called “oligogenic” the inheritance pattern characterising these traits and 
defined it as involving one or a few genes. However, over time, the term ‘oligogenic’ became ambiguous 
and almost synonymic with ‘monogenic’ (see, e.g., Katsanis, 2016). 
5 For a comprehensive database of Mendelian traits, see https://omim.org (Accessed 18 August 2019). See 
also https://www.who.int/genomics/public/geneticdiseases/en/index2.html (Accessed 19 July 2019). 
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“For some discontinuous characteristics, the relation between genotype and phenotype is straight-
forward: each genotype produces a single phenotype, and most phenotypes are encoded by a single 
genotype. Dominance and epistasis may allow different genotypes to produce the same phenotype, 
but the relation remains simple” (Pierce, 2017, ch. 24). 
 
Some of the descriptions above might sound a bit oversimplifying. And, indeed, 
they are. For instance, the idea that the development of qualitative traits is con-
trolled by single genes and that environmental influences have little—if any—role 
seems to overlook the complexity of biological systems—note, for instance, that a 
trait’s expression can be modulated by genetic, epigenetic, and environmental inter-
actions, even in Mendelian diseases (Brooker, 2018; Chen et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 
2013; Hartl & Jones, 1998; Hartwell et al., 2018; Jang, 2005; Katsanis, 2016; Strachan 
& Read, 2011). Moreover, although variation in Mendelian traits usually relates to 
single-gene variations, such traits are apparently anything but ‘simple.’ These as-
pects have attracted many criticisms as they connect, for instance, to genetic deter-
minism, genetic essentialism, and simplistic G-P mapping (Burian & Kampourakis, 
2013; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Kendler, 2005; Jamieson & Radick, 2013; Ratner, 
2004; I will return to these problems in Section 3). 
The description of quantitative traits, on the other hand, seems to be much more 
‘realistic.’ However, many scholars have raised doubts about the suitability of the 
classical polygenic model to account for phenotypic development. Indeed, the model 
is mostly aimed at describing statistical properties of populations like variance and 
heritability and endorses a variety of idealisations on genes’ functioning, e.g., addi-
tivity and equality of genetic effects (see Carlborg & Haley, 2004; Gottlieb, 1995; 
Lewontin, 1974; Nelson et al., 2013; Turkheimer, 2011). Furthermore, the quantita-
tive framework seems to be better suited to describe traits that vary on a single, 
monotonic dimension (like height) and less suited to account for traits like intelli-
gence and mental disorders (I will return to these problems in Section 4). 
Despite these reasonable concerns, the separation between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to the study of phenotypes is widely influential. In the next 
section, I will show that the distinction is not limited to genetics textbooks but ex-
tends to scientific research as well. 
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2.1 Evidence of the Popularity of the Distinction 
 
The separation between quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of phe-
notypes is particularly evident in genetics textbooks, where the quant/qual distinc-
tion is frequently cited to compare and explain Mendelian and quantitative genetics 
(e.g., Ahluwalia, 2009; Brooker, 2018; Falconer & MacKay, 1996; Hartl & Jones, 
1998; Hartwell et al., 2018; Klug et al., 2016; Knopik et al., 2017; Pierce, 2017; Stra-
chan & Read, 2011). Since it is possible that simplifications have been introduced in 
textbooks for pedagogical reasons, one may wonder whether the quant/qual dis-
tinction plays any role beyond education. 
To evaluate this, I conducted a bibliometric research on the database of Web of 
Science (WoS) (see Appendix). The results suggest that the concepts of quantitative 
and qualitative trait are ubiquitous across biological and biomedical sciences 
(37,715 publications cite quantitative traits and characters; 3,233 publications cite 
qualitative or Mendelian traits, characters, and diseases), with no sign that their im-
portance has decreased over time (see Appendix: Query #1-3). Moreover, the num-
ber of publications citing the two terms together is much smaller than the number 
of publications that investigate only one of the two (only 418 publications cite the 
two terms together; see Appendix: Query #4). This suggests that the separation be-
tween the two domains of inquiry is real and strong. 
This bibliometric research is not to be taken as a comprehensive account of the 
use of the quant/qual distinction in the literature. One limitation is that the WoS’ 
Advanced Search tool limits investigation to titles, keywords, and abstracts; this po-
tentially includes irrelevant literature and excludes some relevant publications.6 
For instance, the impressive difference in size between the datasets on quanti-
tative and qualitative traits does not necessarily mean that qualitative traits are of 
little importance in the life sciences: this can well be a merely linguistic bias. Indeed, 
most research on qualitative traits employs terms such as ‘discrete trait/character,’ 
‘qualitative inheritance,’ or just the name of the trait under examination (e.g., ‘cystic 
fibrosis,’ ‘Huntington Chorea,’ and ‘phenylketonuria’). This is testified by the fact that 
the number of results increases if terms such as ‘Mendelian trait/character/disease’ 
are included in the query (see Appendix: Query #3). Notably, genetics textbooks 
 
6 However, these limitations are uniform across the searched titles; so, the research should not present any 
biases when examining trends in the use of the terms over time or across research areas. 
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often use terms other than ‘trait’ as well (e.g., Brooker, 2018; Hartl & Jones, 1998; 
Hartwell et al., 2018; Klug et al., 2016; Strachan & Read; 2011).7 
Another limitation of this bibliometric research is that a simple terminological 
investigation is unable to uncover the reasons why the two terms are employed. In 
the next section, I suggest that the popularity of the two concepts can depend on 
both historical and epistemological reasons. 
 
 
2.2 Potential Reasons for the Popularity of the Distinction 
 
Part of the influence of the quant/qual distinction might be due to the historical sep-
aration of biometrical and Mendelian theories of heredity, with their different meth-
odological and theoretical focus, which resonates in contemporary science—this is 
testified, for instance, by the small number of publications investigating quantitative 
and qualitative traits together (see above). In the early twentieth century, biomet-
rical and Mendelian approaches seemed to be incompatible with each other due to 
their different epistemological and metaphysical stances on a variety of topics. Au-
thors from the two sides disagreed, for instance, on how to characterise the G-P re-
lationship, what genes are, and how evolutionary processes occur (see Ahluwalia, 
2009; Griffiths & Stotz, 2013; Mather & Jinks, 1982; Norton, 1975; Provine, 1971; 
Radick, 2005, 2011; Visscher & Goddard, 2018). Eventually, however, the two theo-
ries revealed to be compatible with each other and were unified into a single theo-
retical model, namely, contemporary quantitative genetics. Scholars who worked on 
this unification proposed that complex traits are influenced by several alleles, each 
of which is inherited according to Mendelian laws.8  
 
7 Note that, although most biological characteristics are thought to be quantitative, much more attention 
in genetics textbooks is given to Mendelian traits—the analysis of quantitative genetics is usually confined 
to a chapter towards the end of the book (e.g., Hartl & Jones, 1998; Pierce, 2017; Snustad & Simmons, 
2012). 
8 The unification of biometrics and Mendelism is usually attributed to Fisher’s 1918 infinitesimal model 
(e.g., Morrison, 2007; Plomin et al., 2013; Visscher & Goddard, 2018). However, well before Fisher, schol-
ars from both sides achieved similar results or proposed ways for bridging the gap between the two, in-
cluding East (1910), Johannsen (1903), Nilsson-Ehle (1909), Pearson (1900), Tammes (1911), Yule 
(1902), but also Mendel himself as well as Weldon in unpublished works (see Cock, 1973; Jamieson & 
Radick, 2013; Müller-Wille & Richmond, 2016; Porter, 2005; Radick, 2005; Roll-Hansen, 1978; Stamhuis, 
1995). I thank Staffan Müller-Wille (personal communication, January 2017) and Ida H. Stamhuis (July 
2019) for pointing at these works. 
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From this synthesis, a sort of consensus originated about the existence of both 
quantitative and qualitative traits: accordingly, quantitative traits represent the 
norm (most biological characteristics are, in this sense, biometrical) but some traits 
(mostly rare diseases) are due to ‘simple’ Mendelian patterns or determined by sin-
gle genes. 
From an epistemological point of view, the popularity of the quant/qual distinc-
tion can be due to its apparent simplicity and putative heuristic power. Indeed, the 
distinction seems to represent a good way to easily grasp a variety of properties 
associated with the two types of traits, including: continuous versus discontinuous 
phenotypic variations; polygenic versus monogenic inheritance patterns; complex 
versus simple G-P maps; and quantitative versus qualitative methodologies. These 
aspects of organismal biology and its study seem to be consistently associated with 
quantitative and qualitative traits, respectively, and this would be a good reason for 
adopting the quant/qual distinction. 
My critical target is the assumption that the distinction is, in fact, consistent. In 
order to clarify the point, let me introduce a hypothetical account of quantitative and 
qualitative traits that sharply separates quantitative and qualitative aspects. Based 
on the received view summarised in Section 2, such an account can be outlined as 
follows (see also Table 1): 
 
1) Population variation: In any given population, some traits are normally distrib-
uted while others give rise to discrete and mutually exclusive categories. In the 
case of continuous variation, individuals display the trait ‘in different degrees’ 
(e.g., stature and IQ). In the case of discontinuous variation, instead, individuals 
display the trait or not (e.g., presence/absence of a disease) or are characterised 
by different forms of the trait (e.g., yellow/green colour). 
 
2) Inheritance patterns: The observed patterns of how phenotypic traits pass from 
parents to offspring can be polygenic or monogenic. While polygenic inheritance 
characterises traits that are inherited in accordance with quantitative genetics 
principles (e.g., Galton’s regression), monogenic inheritance concerns traits in-
herited in accordance with Mendelian laws (e.g., traits can be dominant or reces-
sive). 
 
3) Genotype-phenotype relationship: The G-P map (say, the genetic architecture and 
developmental pathways of biological characteristics) can be either ‘complex’ or 
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‘simple.’ In this view, complex traits develop under the influence of many genetic 
and environmental effects. By contrast, Mendelian traits are due to the influence 
of single, highly penetrant genes, and thus environmental effects are negligible 
for these traits. 
 
4) Methodologies: Different methodologies are traditionally associated with the 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative traits. Statistical and biometrical methods 
(e.g., the analysis of variance, heritability, and GWAS) identify statistical regular-
ities, similarities, and differences between contiguous generations or between 
populations. These methods are better suited to analyse polygenic inheritance 
and the source of continuous variation in natural populations. By contrast, Men-
delian methods are better suited for the study of traits where the G-P map is ‘sim-
ple’ and where population variation is discontinuous. Among them is the analysis 
of pure lines—which is usually adopted in experimental contexts where it is pos-
sible to control for the environment and other developmental variables—but also 
later acquisitions such as linkage analyses, the candidate-gene approach, and 
gene knockout experiments. 
 
 
 
Population 
Variation 
Inheritance 
Patterns 
Genotype- 
Phenotype Map 
Methodologies 
Qualitative Traits 
Mendelian Traits 
Discontinuous 
Monogenic 
Mendelian 
Simple Experimental 
Quantitative 
Traits 
Biometrical Traits 
Continuous Polygenic Complex 
Statistical 
Biometrical 
 
Table 1: A hypothetical account of quantitative and qualitative traits, based on the received views. The account 
sharply separates quantitative and qualitative aspects of organismal biology and its study. 
 
 
In this account, quantitative and qualitative aspects and methodologies are 
clearly disentangled from each other. However, there are important exceptions that 
cast doubts on the suitability of the quant/qual distinction, particularly on its heu-
ristic power and ability to account for the G-P relationship. For instance, many traits 
that vary discontinuously in populations are not necessarily influenced by single 
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genes—rather, they can involve complex G-P maps. Furthermore, the very same 
trait can vary continuously in some circumstances and discontinuously in others. 
In the next two sections, I will consider inconsistencies in the quant/qual dis-
tinction through the analysis of three cases: Mendelian traits (dwarfism and pigmen-
tation), Mendelian diseases (phenylketonuria), and polygenic mental disorders 
(schizophrenia). I will show that these traits can be framed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively depending, for instance, on the methods through which they are inves-
tigated, as well as on factors such as epistemic purposes (e.g., clinical diagnosis ver-
sus causal explanation). This implies that the quant/qual distinction has, at best, a 
limited heuristic power—limited to some local contexts or to the specific methodol-
ogies adopted. 
 
 
3. Beyond Qualitative Traits: The Telling Case of Mendelian Traits 
 
Most biological characteristics are thought to be quantitative or ‘complex.’ In this 
view, many genetic and environmental influences are involved in the development 
of such traits, and this makes sense of why phenotypes of most biological character-
istics are normally distributed. At the same time, we know that individual differ-
ences in complex traits can be categorical or discontinuous in some circumstances, 
e.g., in cases where single genetic variants cause phenotypic abnormalities. This 
leads many to believe that some traits are, in fact, qualitative. How can the same trait 
vary continuously or discontinuously in different circumstances? As I will explain, 
the question itself depends on mistaking Mendelian methods as a guide to provide 
definitional criteria of phenotypic traits.  
 
 
3.1 The Cases of Dwarfism and Pigmentation in Plant and Animal Models 
 
Height is usually considered a quantitative trait across the animal and plant king-
dom, which means that it varies continuously in populations and there is no single 
gene ‘for’ height. However, in some circumstances, height can vary discontinuously. 
This happened, for instance, in Mendel’s classical study of pea plants (Mendel, 
1866). 
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“One of the characteristics studied by Mendel was the height of pea plants, which can be described 
by measuring the length of a plant’s stem. However, Mendel’s particular plants exhibited only two 
distinct phenotypes (some were tall and others short), and these differences were determined by 
alleles at a single locus. The differences that Mendel studied were therefore discontinuous in nature” 
(Pierce, 2017, ch. 24). 
 
Essentially, the problem lies in the fact that traits that can be measured on a 
continuous scale do not always exhibit continuous variation. A fruitful way to clarify 
this is considering Mather’s explanation of this phenomenon: 
 
“It is possible that, if some organism could be grown in a constant environment and rendered homo-
zygous for all but one of the genes affecting a quantitative character, this one gene might be observed 
to segregate and give sharply distinct classes just as a qualitative gene does. […] Stature, for example, 
is usually a quantitative character, but in many organisms, dwarf forms are known to segregate 
sharply from the normal type, so falling into the qualitative class” (Mather, 1941, p. 160). 
 
The circumstances Mather refers to are basically those in which all individuals 
in a population are exposed to equal (or similar enough) environmental conditions 
and are genetically identical (or similar enough) to each other but for one gene. In 
these circumstances, variation at one locus makes a difference at the level of pheno-
typic variation in a population.9 These circumstances are, for instance, those re-
quired to identify genetic mutations in the analysis of pure lines. Here, researchers 
are interested in the differential action of genes, that is, the effects of single genetic 
variants while other variables are held constant. This approach characterised, for 
instance, Thomas Morgan’s research on Drosophila melanogaster in the 1910s: 
 
“Morgan and his school were well aware that, as a rule, many genes were involved in the development 
of a particular trait as, e.g., eye-color, and that one gene could affect several characters. […] What 
mattered to them was the relationship between a change in a gene and a change in a trait, rather than 
the nature of these entities themselves. Thus the alteration of a trait could be causally related to a 
change in (or a loss of) a single genetic factor, even if it was plausible in general that a trait like eye-
color was, in fact, determined by a whole group of variously interacting genes” (Rheinberger et al., 
2015). 
 
Research has revealed that eye colour in Drosophila is due to two separate bio-
chemical pathways producing brown and red pigments, respectively. Moreover, 
 
9 On the concept of genetic difference-maker and other definitions of genetic causality, see Burian & Kam-
pourakis (2013), DiFrisco & Jaeger (forthcoming), Griffiths & Stotz (2013), Lynch (under review), Okasha 
(2009), Waters (2007). 
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pigments bind to a granule in the pigment cell of the eye. Failure of this binding pro-
cess, or disruptions in the biochemical pathways that produce pigments, result in 
the lack of pigment regardless of the pigments produced (see Pollock, 1989). Nota-
bly, when variation in a trait depends on single-gene mutations, the trait appears to 
have a simple, linear correlation to one gene (read: a simple G-P map) as long as 
other developmental elements remain constant. However, this does not imply that 
the trait is monogenic or ‘simple’ in developmental terms: what is simple, if any-
thing, is the separation between two classes of phenotypes, e.g., ‘normal’ and ‘abnor-
mal’ height or different colours. Thus, contra the received view of qualitative traits, 
traits that can vary discontinuously in populations can still develop under the influ-
ence of many genetic and environmental effects.10 
Early geneticists (e.g., Morgan et al., 1915) were aware that the natural devel-
opment of, for instance, pigmentation is due to many genes—each of which, we now 
know, encodes a specific enzyme that enters a biochemical cascade producing the 
observed colour. However, eventually, this causal explanation was simplified to the 
point that a simple G-P map (one gene-one trait) was inferred from Mendelian stud-
ies (see, e.g., DiFrisco & Jaeger, 2019; Rheinberger et al., 2015). Simplifications of 
this sort are especially evident in scientific education and communication, where 
discourses about the gene ‘for’ x (where x is any complex trait) are rampant (see 
Burian & Kampourakis, 2013; Jamieson & Radick, 2013; Kendler, 2005; Ratner, 
2004). 
Importantly, the concept of qualitative trait both reflects and perpetuates the 
simplifications above. In the next section, I focus on Mendelian diseases as other 
problematic cases for the quant/qual distinction and provide directions for thinking 
beyond the concept of qualitative trait. 
 
 
3.2 The Case of Phenylketonuria 
 
Traits like cystic fibrosis and Huntington Chorea are usually regarded as qualitative 
traits insofar as they are influenced by single genes. This simple G-P relationship has 
been translated into praxis as a diffuse definitional approach that takes the empiri-
cal association between genotypic and phenotypic variation to identify phenotypic 
 
10 Note, for instance, that many traits that have been long considered Mendelian or monogenic, like eye and 
hair colour, have proved to be polygenic (see McDonald, 2012; Sturm & Frudakis, 2004). 
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traits themselves. The case of phenylketonuria (PKU), a widely studied metabolic 
disorder, is particularly telling about the impossibility of defining phenotypes that 
way. 
Phenylalanine is an amino acid contained in many types of food which is part of 
our everyday diet. In the human body, phenylalanine is metabolised by an enzyme 
called phenylalanine hydroxylase, which mostly exerts its function in the liver. In 
individuals affected by PKU, the enzyme is incapable of converting phenylalanine 
into tyrosine, so phenylalanine assumed through diet is stockpiled in blood and 
brain. This can result in various neurodevelopmental issues, including severe cogni-
tive disability. Genetically, PKU is associated to mutations in the PAH gene, which is 
located on the twelfth chromosome (an individual must carry two recessive PAH al-
leles to manifest the clinical condition). 
PKU seems to fit well into the standard definition of qualitative trait. Indeed, any 
population can be divided into two categories: healthy and affected individuals. In 
developmental terms, since PKU is due to mutations in a single gene, the G-P map is 
fairly simple, and this leads to the assumption that mutations in the PAH gene are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being affected by the disease (e.g., Knopik et 
al., 2017; Plomin et al., 2013). 
There are two major problems with this popular characterisation of PKU. The 
first problem concerns the simplified view of the G-P map it offers (see Section 3.1). 
The second problem regards the usual definitional criteria adopted for Mendelian 
diseases. Let us see them one by one. 
It is well known that it is possible to prevent the PKU’s clinical onset by adopting 
a diet poor of phenylalanine early in childhood. This means that phenylalanine in-
take and a mutation in the PAH gene are both necessary for developing PKU; thus, it 
would be more accurate to say that mutations in the PAH gene are necessary but not 
individually sufficient (see Kempthorne, 1978). But the story does not end there: ge-
netic mutations involved in Mendelian diseases are not always completely pene-
trant, that is, an individual can harbour such mutations but not develop symptoms 
(Chen et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2013; Katsanis, 2016; Lynch, under review). Note, 
for instance, that researchers have identified about 500 different PAH mutations as-
sociated with PKU, with different phenotypic effects (Plomin et al., 2013; Scriver, 
2007). This makes it even harder to make claims about necessary and sufficient con-
ditions of qualitative traits or to say that their inheritance pattern is ‘simple.’ 
Let us turn to the second problem. The definition of PKU as a trait in general 
(and a qualitative one, specifically) draws on the association between the disease 
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and single-gene mutations. Thus, essentially, PKU is taken as a qualitative trait inso-
far as it relates to a well-defined genotypic characteristic. However, it is worth ask-
ing: is PKU a trait at all? 
To address the question (and to clarify its very purpose), let me introduce the 
distinction between characters and character states (or simply states, hereafter). 
These two terms are frequently mentioned in the literature on homology as regards 
questions on morphological development across different taxa (see DiFrisco, 2019; 
Colless, 1985; Wagner, 2014).11 Notably, the use of the two terms in biology is not 
at all consistent (for some reviews, see Colless, 1985; Freudenstein, 2005; Fristrup, 
2001). 
In my discussion, characters represent general, species-specific phenotypic 
characteristics, e.g., height, skin colour, and intelligence in humans. On the other 
hand, character states are determinate properties or values of those characters that 
vary between the members of a species (either continuously or discontinuously) 
and, thus, characterise individual organisms, e.g., dwarfism, a specific height value, 
a specific skin colour, cognitive disability, or a specific IQ score. In other words, char-
acters come in different forms or states in different individuals of a given species.12 
I shall suggest that PKU would be better understood as a character state, rather 
than a character, specifically a state of the character ‘liver metabolism.’ Accordingly, 
there is a variety of possible states of liver metabolism, each of which characterises 
different individuals; PKU is one of such states, particularly one that involves the 
inability of metabolising phenylalanine due to malfunctioning of the enzyme phe-
nylalanine hydroxylase. Strictly speaking, mutations in the PAH gene cause prob-
lems in the structure and function of such enzyme, driving liver metabolism towards 
the PKU state. By contrast, the development of the general liver metabolism (the 
character) is not just caused by one gene: rather, several genetic and environmental 
influences are involved in the development of liver metabolism. Thus, PKU repre-
sents a condition in which an abrupt disruption of normal development occurs. In 
this sense, PKU, rather than a trait stricto sensu, represents a variant form (a state) 
of the normal liver metabolism. 
 
11 I thank James DiFrisco for pointing at this literature (personal communication, August 2018). 
12 In metaphysical terms, characters and states can be considered determinables and determinates, respec-
tively (on this distinction, see Wilson, 2017). For instance, ‘red eye’ and ‘brown eye’ are determinates of 
the determinable ‘eye colour.’ 
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The characters/states distinction aims to stress that the development of charac-
ters like height, intelligence, and physiological systems usually relates to many in-
teracting genetic and environmental influences; by contrast, character states can 
sometimes causally depend on just one genetic difference-maker, as in the case of 
Mendelian diseases like PKU.13 Thus, defining phenotypic traits on the basis of sin-
gle-gene mutations—and taking PKU, for instance, as a character—can misrepre-
sent how biological systems (and complex systems in general) work. 
To make the point clearer, let us consider the laptop on which I am now typing. 
The laptop is made of a high number of components that are designed and intercon-
nected to generate my everyday experience with the device. The internal organisa-
tion of the laptop is complex enough to prevent significant changes in its behaviour 
due to a small malfunctioning in its hardware. However, some malfunctioning can 
have disruptive effects on my laptop. For instance, malfunctioning in the hard drive 
will put my machine in serious danger, and I may experience a variety of issues, e.g., 
errors in the information visualised on the display, errors in the files system, inter-
net connection issues, and so forth. If a malfunctioning in the hardware is associated 
with, for instance, malfunctioning in the music player, e.g., crackling audio, one 
might be tempted to describe the malfunctioning itself (the crackling audio) as a 
‘trait’ of the laptop and to identify the single defective hardware component as the 
major ‘developmental cause’ of the trait. This, however, would be a serious misun-
derstanding. 
 A component that generates an error in the laptop’s behaviour is not neces-
sarily what causes the laptop’s behaviour in normal conditions: it can be that the 
defective component makes a difference in the behaviour of the laptop by causing 
major disruptions in the system. However, the normal behaviour of the laptop is due 
 
13 Note that my definition of characters and states is consistent with Lawrence’s (2008) but departs from 
that of scholars working on homology. For instance, according to Wagner, “the relationship between char-
acter identity and character states is the same as that for gene identity and alleles in genetics” (2014, pp. 
53-54). This seems to imply that there is a one-to-one relationship between, for instance, the alleles a, b 
and c of the gene x and the relative states a*, b*, and c* of the character x*. However, in my definition, the 
relationship between a gene and its possible alleles (at the genotypic level) and a character and its possible 
states (at the phenotypic level) is just analogical and should not be understood in causal terms. Indeed, 
different states of the same character can have different types of developmental causes. For instance, the 
state a* can be due to just one difference-maker, but the state b* can be influenced by many genes or involve 
environmental influences. Moreover, the developmental causes of a character can differ greatly from those 
of its states. For example, the character ‘eye colour’ in flies develops under the influences of many genes, 
but the state ‘red eye’ can depend on just one genetic difference-maker. In other words, the species-specific 
development of a trait on the one hand, and the development of specific variants of such trait on the other, 
can be due to (partly) different developmental causes. 
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to its many interacting components, which all are necessary for the proper function-
ing of the machine. Conceptually, as regards the trait’s identification, the abnormal 
behaviour of the laptop would be better regarded as one possible state of the lap-
top’s behaviour, rather than a trait. 
To return to biology, mutations in an individual’s genotype can make a differ-
ence to a variety of observable characteristics of the organism. In PKU, for instance, 
mutations in the PAH gene can affect the liver’s functioning and lead to neurodevel-
opmental issues and cognitive disability. However, the mutated PAH gene does not 
cause a trait (and, a fortiori, not a qualitative one). Rather, it drives a biological sys-
tem towards one of the possible states of the liver metabolism character. 
To summarise, analysing phenotypic variation and the G-P map along the lines 
above reveals that the concept of qualitative trait is far more ambiguous (and, there-
fore, less heuristically useful) than usually acknowledged. Moreover, the concept of 
qualitative trait can lead us to take the association between single-gene variations 
and phenotypic variations as guidance to identify traits themselves—it is in this def-
initional approach that probably lies a major source of oversimplified, popular de-
scriptions of genetics findings in scientific education and communication (see Sec-
tion 3.1). However, in developmental terms, what we often call ‘qualitative traits’ 
are not even traits: they are states of far more complex polygenic traits (not neces-
sarily quantitative, though; see Section 5). 
In the next section, I will discuss the concept of quantitative traits by analysing 
the case of polygenic mental disorders—specifically, schizophrenia—and argue that 
this concept, when applied to behavioural phenotypes, invites equivocations as well. 
 
 
4. Beyond Quantitative Traits: The Telling Case of Mental Disorders 
 
The general idea behind the notion of quantitative trait is that individuals differ from 
each other quantitatively in terms of a single, monotonic dimension. For instance, 
an individual’s skin pigmentation can be described as a point in a mono-dimensional 
space. Likewise, individuals vary in height on a single dimension that can be meas-
ured in centimetres or inches. This characterisation might sound unproblematic for 
physical traits like height but, in the case of behavioural traits, it is. Traits like intel-
ligence and mental disorders are unlikely reducible to a single dimension: rather, 
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they involve several properties at different levels of organisation that are qualita-
tively distinct from each other.14 
For the sake of the discussion, I will leave aside the problem of how to define 
schizophrenia and mental disorders more generally.15 My central aim is to show that 
the concept of quantitative trait seems unable to account for complex traits that vary 
discontinuously in populations. Mental disorders, for instance, are often considered 
yes/no traits because “disorders are diagnosed as either-or dichotomies” (Plomin et 
al., 2013, p. 88), but they arguably are anything but simple or monogenic. Recently, 
researchers have made the case that all mental disorders might be, in fact, inherently 
quantitative (see Plomin et al., 2009). 
In this section, I take schizophrenia as a case study to assess whether mental 
disorders fit in the standard definition of quantitative trait. I will argue that this is 
not the case and that schizophrenia is better characterised by the so-called threshold 
model. In this view, neither purely quantitative nor purely qualitative explanatory 
strategies seem to work here. These complications testify that, in the behavioural 
domain, the quant/qual distinction loses its clarity and does not represent a practi-
cal and powerful heuristic tool. 
 
 
4.1 The Case of Schizophrenia 
 
The DSM’s definitional approach is well-known to be symptoms-based and categor-
ical in nature: several signs and symptoms are associated with a given clinical pic-
ture, and diagnosis only occurs if an individual presents a minimum number of such 
symptoms (APA, 2013; Jang, 2005). In DSM-5, for instance, schizophrenia’s diagnos-
tic criteria include two or more symptoms among delusions, hallucinations, 
 
14 For instance, at the behavioural level, IQ represents a single dimension on which all individuals can be 
placed. However, this dimension does not correspond to a single cognitive or biological phenomenon: ra-
ther, the behavioural generality of intelligence is realised by the interaction between many cognitive and 
neurobiological processes, e.g., working memory, processing speed, reasoning, metacognition, and neural 
plasticity, as well as linguistic, mathematical, and visuospatial abilities (see Kovacs & Conway, 2016; Kray 
& Frensch, 2002; Serpico, 2018; Van der Maas et al., 2006). 
15 Here, I refer to the definition of schizophrenia adopted in contemporary psychiatric nosography (i.e., the 
one usually cited by behavioural geneticists), which is mostly based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM), now at its fifth edition (APA, 2013). 
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disorganised speech, disorganised or catatonic behaviour, and negative symp-
toms—at least one of the first three must be observed (APA, 2013, p. 99).16 
Thus, in terms of phenotypic variation, schizophrenia tends to vary discontinu-
ously in populations: broadly speaking, individuals can be affected by the disorder 
or not. As Nick Haslam notices, 
 
“Existing psychiatric classifications generally represent mental disorders as discrete […] categories, 
and diagnoses are made in a dichotomous, present-or-absent fashion” (Haslam, 2014, p. 15).17 
 
Nevertheless, no one would say that disorders like schizophrenia are ‘simple’ in 
the sense of the definition of qualitative traits: indeed, the development of such 
traits (as well as their variation) is widely thought to be due to multiple genetic and 
environmental effects. To hold together the etiological complexity of mental disor-
ders with the (at least apparent) ‘simplicity’ of their phenotypic variability, behav-
ioural geneticists have proposed two main theoretical models: first, the quantita-
tive-liability model, which frames them in a purely quantitative way; second, the 
threshold model, which conceptualises disorders through a sort of mixed quantita-
tive-qualitative strategy.18 
These two models share the assumption that genetic risk factors are normally 
distributed and introduce a variable called liability to which underlying risk factors 
would contribute (Falconer, 1965; Snustad & Simmons, 2012, p. 610). In accordance 
with the polygenic model of complex traits (see Section 2), some alleles are thought 
to increase the risk of developing a given disorder. For instance, in Knopik and col-
leagues’ words, 
 
“Theoretically, there should be a continuum of genetic risk, from people having none of the alleles 
that increase risk for schizophrenia to those having most of the alleles that increase risk. Most people 
should fall between these extremes, with only a moderate susceptibility to schizophrenia” (Knopik 
et al., 2017, p. 36). 
 
 
16 Diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia involve other aspects concerning, e.g., the level of social functioning 
and the persistence of symptoms over time. These aspects are not relevant to my discussion. 
17 Note that, although diagnosis remains categorical, the latest edition of DSM includes a sort of ‘spectrum’ 
of psychotic disorders, where some conditions are characterised by fewer (or less severe) symptoms than 
major disorders (APA, 2013, p. 122; see also Fusar-Poli et al., 2013). I thank Valentina Petrolini for pointing 
at this literature (personal communication, January 2020). About categorical versus dimensional ap-
proaches in psychiatry, see Keil et al. (2017). 
18 While the name ‘threshold model’ is somewhat standard, ‘quantitative-liability model’ is of my choice. 
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The two models mostly differ in how they conceptualise another concept they 
introduce, that is, the concept of threshold. This concept is intuitively described as a 
point where the underlying genetic risk produces, like an on/off button, a discontin-
uous variation. However, threshold is admittedly a hypothetical construct that 
needs further investigations (Burton et al., 2007; Falconer, 1965; Knopik et al., 
2017). The differing way the two models conceptualise thresholds is important for 
our discussion as it makes the difference between a purely quantitative and a non-
quantitative account of traits like schizophrenia. In the next two sections, I will ana-
lyse these two theoretical models in detail. 
 
 
4.2 The Quantitative-liability Model 
 
According to the quantitative-liability model, symptoms of mental disorders in-
crease continuously from normality to abnormality, and disorders denote condi-
tions that are conventionally separated from normality due to pragmatic concerns. 
For instance, the threshold can be drawn on the basis of the number of symptoms, 
like in the case of DSM’s cut-offs, or of their clinical significance (Jang, 2005). Accord-
ing to Knopik and colleagues, this is straightforward for traits like depression:  
 
“People vary in the frequency and severity of their depression. Some people rarely get the blues; for 
others, depression completely disrupts their lives. Individuals diagnosed as depressed might be ex-
treme cases that differ quantitatively, not qualitatively, from the rest of the population” (Knopik et 
al., 2017, p. 37). 
 
Even for disorders like schizophrenia, the authors say, there may be no sharp 
line dividing the normal from the abnormal, but rather a continuum from normality 
to abnormality (Knopik et al., 2017, pp. 36-37; Plomin et al., 2009). 
Notably, a “certain level of symptom severity” is not to be taken as a point where 
the accumulation of risk-factors produces a ‘real’ qualitative change in the system. 
In other words, in the quantitative-liability model (in contrast to the threshold 
model, see Section 4.3), thresholds do not represent ‘natural’ or ‘internal’ disconti-
nuities.19 So, the biology of schizophrenic individuals is thought to be quantitatively 
 
19 On this view, mental disorders would correspond to so-called practical kinds (see Haslam 2014; Zachar, 
2000). 
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different from the biology of healthy ones, rather than qualitatively, and discontin-
uous variation in schizophrenia is just ‘apparent.’ 
A way for understanding this model is to conceive of liability as a measure of 
how penetrant the genotype is on the phenotype, that is, of how much underlying 
genetic risk becomes visible at the phenotypic level—all other developmental ele-
ments being equal. In some individuals, the number of ‘pathological alleles’ is high 
enough to generate clinically significant symptoms, so that diagnosis occurs. By con-
trast, in healthy individuals, the number of ‘pathological alleles’ is too small to make 
symptoms clinically relevant or even detectable, but symptoms are, in a sense, al-
ways there.20 This implies that we all are affected by schizophrenia, but to a different 
degree: we just differ to each other in terms of how penetrant the ‘schizophrenic 
genotype’ is on our phenotype and on how much symptoms impact our lives. 
According to the advocates of the quantitative-liability model, schizophrenia fits 
in the standard definition of quantitative trait. For instance, Plomin and colleagues 
(2009) argue that the model involves a radical shift in focus from a qualitative to a 
quantitative framework of mental disorders: 
 
“These quantitative traits need not be limited to symptoms of the diagnosed disorder but can occur 
at any level of analysis. […] Once multiple genes are found to be associated with a disorder, under-
standing the mechanisms by which each gene affects the disorder leads to quantitative traits being 
recognized at all levels of analysis: from gene expression profiles, to other ‘-omic’ levels of analysis, 
to physiology and often to the structure and function of the brain” (Plomin et al., 2009, p. 874). 
 
Although this model might sound attractive for the supporters of a dimensional 
characterisation of mental disorders, it presents two conceptual problems that raise 
doubts on this particular interpretation of quantitative traits: first, the assumption 
that genetic risk is normally distributed is essentially based on the observation of 
symptoms; second, the model identifies mental disorders with characters, while 
they probably are character states. Let us analyse these problems one by one. 
The first problem concerns the fact that the assumption of a continuum between 
normality and pathology at the genotypic level draws on the continuum observed at 
the phenotypic level: symptoms have degrees of severity, and such severity is un-
derstood as a function of the number of ‘pathological alleles’ (those that bring about 
 
20 Note that the model assumes that there is a frequency distribution for the severity of every symptom, 
and each person displays all symptoms to some degree (Jang, 2005, p. 47). 
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negative effects at the phenotypic level, see Section 2). In this sense, the model offers 
a somewhat linear view of the G-P map. 
In part, this view is inherited by classical models in quantitative genetics 
(Fisher, 1918; Mather, 1943), where linearity was a mathematical idealisation (see 
DiFrisco & Jaeger, 2019; Nelson et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2009). This view, however, is 
also based on the assumption that observed symptoms represent useful starting 
points to make hypotheses on the genetic basis of mental disorders. This somehow 
contrasts with recent trends in psychiatric research. For instance, the NIHM Re-
search Domain Criteria framework (RDoC) reflects a trend in research aimed at un-
packing classical symptoms-based clinical pictures to identify their multiple cogni-
tive and emotional components, with an eye on the social determinants of disorders, 
too. As Insel explains, 
 
“So far, we don’t have rigorously tested, reproducible, clinically actionable biomarkers for any psy-
chiatric disorder. Genetic findings are statistical associations of risk, not diagnostic of disease; neu-
roimaging findings report mean group changes, not individual differences; and metabolic findings 
are not specific. We can improve the resolution with each of these modalities, but we may never have 
a biomarker for any symptom-based diagnosis because these diagnostic categories were never de-
signed for biological validity” (Insel, 2014, p. 395). 
 
The popularity of the RDoC’s approach among philosophers and theorists of 
psychiatry testifies a general distrust for models that make claims on the biology of 
mental disorders on the basis of observable symptoms. As far as this applies to the 
quantitative-liability model of schizophrenia, a continuum in symptoms’ severity 
does not necessarily imply that schizophrenia is a quantitative trait, nor that we all 
are schizophrenic ‘to different degrees.’ 
A second problem with the quantitative-liability model is that it conceptualises 
disorders as characters. As I mentioned, the model holds that we all are affected by 
mental disorders like depression and schizophrenia: while for some of us symptoms 
are not clinically significant, so they are for others. This implies that schizophrenia 
is essentially comparable to other species-specific traits like height, skin colour, and 
intelligence, which are shared by all human beings—we all are tall to a certain de-
gree, we all have pigmentated skin cells, we all are ‘intelligent.’ 
However, as in the case of PKU examined in Section 3.2, schizophrenia is un-
likely a species-specific character; rather, it is a character state, that is, a variant form 
of a character. But what character? Classical research on the neurobiology of schiz-
ophrenia attributes its typical symptoms to a disturbed and hyperactive 
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dopaminergic signal transduction, but other studies have pointed at the involve-
ment of the glutaminergic system and of malfunctioning in gliogenesis (see Coyle, 
2006; Dietz et al., 2020; Insel, 2010; Kendler, 2014). Regardless of what hypothesis 
will turn out to be empirically correct, the characters/states distinction suggests 
framing schizophrenia as one possible state of the functioning of the human neuro-
endocrine-metabolic system.21 
This implies, contra the quantitative-liability model, that schizophrenia is not a 
trait that all humans have ‘to different degrees.’ Rather, all humans have a neuroen-
docrine system that produces neuropeptides in response to both internal and exter-
nal stimuli; the functioning of this system can vary from person to person and from 
time to time and, for some individuals at specific points in time, the system’s func-
tioning produces clinically relevant symptoms associated with the clinical picture 
described in DSM.  
In sum, the quantitative-liability model, as an account of the genetics of schizo-
phrenia, is conceptually problematic: on the one hand, the multiple dimensions hy-
pothesised are merely symptomatic in nature; on the other, the model misinterprets 
mental disorders as characters. If my arguments are sound, the attempt to provide 
a purely quantitative description of schizophrenia is just as problematic as the at-
tempt to provide a purely qualitative description of Mendelian diseases (analysed in 
Section 3.2). 
In the next section, I will discuss the threshold model of schizophrenia, accord-
ing to which this disorder can be reduced neither to the standard definition of quan-
titative traits nor to that of qualitative trait. This suggests that, at least in the case of 
schizophrenia, the quant/qual distinction is not heuristically powerful as it is in-
tended to be. 
 
 
4.3 The Threshold Model: A Promising Way Out? 
 
The threshold model and the quantitative-liability model of schizophrenia share the 
view that genetic risk-factors are normally distributed. However, the threshold 
model conceives of thresholds as sorts of ‘internal discontinuities’ or ‘switch-points’ 
 
21 It is well possible that more than one schizophrenia state will be identified, each of which associated 
with its own typical symptoms, biomarkers, and aetiologies. This would not represent an obstacle for my 
proposal to conceive of schizophrenia(s) as a state(s) instead of a character(s). 
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where the accumulation of such factors brings about a mental disorder (Pierce, 
2017; Plomin et al., 2013). Thus, thresholds are conceived of as ‘genuine’ features of 
biological systems, rather than something that is just conventionally placed. 
Metaphorically, thresholds can be understood as ‘on/off buttons.’ On/off states, 
then, would represent two qualitatively different states of a biological system, which 
correspond to the presence or absence of schizophrenia. This implies that the biol-
ogy of schizophrenic individuals is qualitatively different from the biology of healthy 
ones, rather than just quantitatively. 
Note that this characterisation of schizophrenia is not reducible to the standard 
definitions of quantitative or qualitative traits: on the one hand, schizophrenia is not 
a quantitative trait because the pathological state is described as qualitatively dif-
ferent from the healthy one(s); on the other hand, schizophrenia is not a qualitative 
trait because, albeit it can vary discontinuously in populations, it is complex and pol-
ygenic. 
The hypothesis that mental disorders like schizophrenia are threshold traits is 
not new (e.g., Plomin et al., 2013). However, in contrast to the concept of quantita-
tive liability, the concept of threshold in behavioural genetics (and in genetics more 
generally) seems to be relatively unexplored—note that textbooks usually dedicate 
to the concept just a few words (see, e.g., Brooker, 2018; Klug et al., 2016; Pierce, 
2017). Due to inconsistencies of the quantitative-liability model, it is worth consid-
ering more seriously the threshold model as a potential account of schizophrenia 
and, at the same time, as a way out from the quant/qual distinction. So, in the rest of 
this section, I will delineate how thresholds could be understood and what merits 
the threshold model has in comparison with the quantitative-liability model. 
A possible way to understand the threshold model in genetic terms is that the 
presence of a high-enough number of ‘pathological’ alleles produces a ‘switch’ in the 
system. In this sense, a threshold would not just be a point arbitrarily placed on a 
continuum, but rather a real change in the system due to the accumulation of a given 
number of genetic effects. However, systemic changes of this sort are unlikely re-
ducible to genetic factors and can rather involve specific interactions between ge-
netic and environmental influences. 
Research from outside behavioural genetics can be informative as regards the 
characterisation of thresholds. For instance, the concept of threshold plays a central 
role in the study of evolvability and plasticity of sexual and morphological develop-
ment and environmental stress tolerance. Here, threshold traits are characterised 
as traits that have only two or a few phenotypic classes, but their development is 
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determined by the effects of multiple genetic, epigenetic, and environmental effects 
(Ostrowski et al., 2000; Roff et al., 1997). For instance, in various species, phenotypic 
transitions in development can be induced by environmental stress and controlled 
by stress-response proteins like the Hsp90 chaperone (Milton et al., 2006; Ruther-
ford, 2003). 
In developmental terms, thresholds can be conceptualised in terms of bifurca-
tions between stable regimes in the dynamical systems theory (Jaeger & Monk, 
2014) or in terms of branching points in alternative developmental paths in Wad-
dington’s epigenetics (Waddington, 1941, 2008). Note that the genetic factors from 
which these bifurcations or thresholds originate do not need to be just quantitative 
or additive; rather, thresholds might involve heterogeneous genetic effects, e.g., 
some genes with major effects plus many genes of small effects. 
Let us now consider the potential merits of the threshold model. The character-
isation of schizophrenia as a threshold trait seems able to overcome the difficulties 
involved in the standard definition of qualitative and quantitative traits. First, the 
model accounts for the complex, polygenic architecture of schizophrenia—which is, 
essentially, the good part of the concept of quantitative trait. Second, the observed 
discontinuity in phenotypic variation is not accounted for by single-gene varia-
tions—which is the central limitation of the concept of qualitative trait (see Section 
3). Third, the threshold model avoids linear effects between the genotype and the 
phenotype—in contrast to the G-P linearity characterising the quantitative-liability 
model (see Section 4.2).  
Moreover, the threshold model nicely accommodates the distinction between 
characters and states. As I argued in Section 4.2, schizophrenia can be regarded as 
one possible state of the human neuroendocrine-metabolic system. I also explained 
that the threshold model conceives of thresholds as switch-points that make the dif-
ference between two possible states of a biological system. By combining the two 
things, we can see that the threshold can be what makes the difference between two 
possible states of a neuroendocrine-metabolic character—which, as I noticed above, 
is to be empirically identified.22 
It should be noted that many character states are qualitatively distinct from each 
other, e.g., sexual and morphological dimorphisms. In such cases, it would be 
 
22 On this view, the schizophrenia state(s) would be stably associated with some symptoms and bi-
omarkers, and this cluster of properties would allow us to distinguish between the schizophrenia state(s) 
and other possible states of the neuroendocrine-metabolic system. 
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counterintuitive to think that the threshold differentiating the two possible states of 
a character is placed for just conventional or statistical reasons (as the quantitative-
liability model suggests for mental disorders). This makes the threshold model, with 
its biological interpretation of thresholds and qualitative changes, an attractive al-
ternative to a purely quantitative description of schizophrenia. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I challenged the received view of quantitative and qualitative traits 
and proposed directions for framing phenotypes beyond such two concepts. I 
started by suggesting that the quant/qual distinction might owe its popularity to the 
assumption that it represents a powerful heuristic to understand a variety of aspects 
of biological organisms and their study. In this view, the concept of quantitative trait 
would be systematically associated with continuous variation, polygenic inher-
itance, and complex G-P maps; by contrast, the concept of qualitative trait would be 
associated with discontinuous variation, monogenic inheritance, and simple G-P 
maps. Then, I examined cases from Mendelian and behavioural genetics that show 
that this assumption is problematic because cases arise that do not fulfil the criteria 
usually associated with each type of trait. Moreover, the quant/qual distinction in-
volves unwarranted simplifications on how to define phenotypic traits. 
Specifically, I argued that, in the study of Mendelian traits, the standard defini-
tion of qualitative trait implies that some traits are monogenic or involve a simple 
G-P map; importantly, it also implies that Mendelian genes are all equally penetrant, 
which ignores phenomena such as incomplete penetrance, phenotypic plasticity, 
and robustness of biological systems. Ultimately, phenotypic development is much 
more complex than what the concept of qualitative trait entails: what can be quali-
tative, monogenic, or ‘simple’ is just phenotypic variation in specific and contextual 
conditions. Moreover, the concept of qualitative trait can lead us to take the associ-
ation of single-genetic variants and phenotypic variation as a guide to provide a def-
inition of traits themselves. The Mendelian traits and diseases here examined mis-
take character states as characters in order to fit such a definition. 
Additionally, the standard definition of quantitative trait does not apply to men-
tal disorders such as schizophrenia: contemporary models aimed at describing them 
as quantitative traits present remarkable conceptual deficiencies—the most im-
portant of which is that mental disorders are conceptualised as characters. 
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For the sake of brevity, I could analyse only specific examples where the 
quant/qual distinction falls short of its ambitions of providing a powerful concep-
tual framework. Thus, it is possible that for some traits the quant/qual distinction 
works better than for others. Nonetheless, I suspect that the arguments and the so-
lutions I proposed here could be generalised to other cases. For instance, it is possi-
ble that most pathological conditions (both Mendelian and non-Mendelian) are to 
be considered as character states, rather than characters. If so, the range of applica-
bility of the concepts of qualitative and quantitative trait would be narrower. 
Note also that, in contrast to what the received view might suggest, problems 
with the concept of qualitative trait would not make most traits falling under the 
definition of quantitative trait. Indeed, it is possible that emblematic quantitative 
traits like human height and IQ can be decomposed into more elementary sub-traits 
related to different developmental modules at different developmental stages. This 
would imply that, in developmental terms, such traits could not be described as in-
volving a single dimension on which all individuals of a species can be placed (on 
height, see Orgogozo et al., 2015; on intelligence, see Footnote #14). This would re-
duce the extension of the concept of quantitative trait, too. If so, many so-called 
quantitative traits might reveal to involve complex dynamical effects (e.g., thresh-
olds) due to heterogeneous genetic factors, e.g., both a small number of highly pen-
etrant genes and the small influence of many other genes. This would make many 
traits neither qualitative nor quantitative but rather, perhaps unsurprisingly, simply 
complex. 
It is important to keep in mind that the concepts of quantitative and qualitative 
traits entail definitional criteria of phenotypic characteristics that can impact the 
way we conceptualise phenotypic development. If misconceptions of any sorts are 
involved, they can only have negative effects on how biological research is con-
ducted. The inconsistencies I identified in the quant/qual distinction point to the 
necessity of a conceptually-sound definitional approach for biological characteris-
tics beyond classical dichotomies. Such an approach should be capable of disentan-
gling the causal aspects of phenotypic development from the specific idealisations 
and methodologies characterising different research areas. 
Ultimately, the identification of phenotypic traits is only in part an empirical or 
methodological problem. Rather, the question is conceptual in nature. 
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Appendix: Bibliometric Research on the Web of Science Database 
Below are summarised the results of a bibliometric research on the database of Web of Science 
(Core Collection) (accessed August 2019). 
Four queries (i.e., Topics, ‘TS’) have been investigated through the Advanced Search tool: 
1. TS=(“quantitative trait*” OR “quantitative character*”) 
2. TS=(“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*”) 
3. TS=(“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*” OR "Mendelian trait*" OR "Men-
delian character*" OR "Mendelian disease*") 
4. TS=(“quantitative trait*” AND “qualitative trait*” OR “quantitative character*” AND 
“qualitative character*”) 
Below the results of each query are included: 
 Bar Graph per year of publication 
 Bar Graph and Records per research area 
 The criteria used for refining the research (i.e., Document Type and Categories) 
 
The Web of Science database is accessible at: https://login.webofknowledge.com 
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QUERY 1: TS=(“quantitative trait*” OR “quantitative character*”) 
 
Results: 37,715 
Timespan: All years (1985-2019) 
Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI 
 
 
Bar Graph 1: Query (“quantitative trait*” OR “quantitative character*”) per year of publication 
 
 
 
 
Bar Graph 2: Query (“quantitative trait*” OR “quantitative character*”) per research area 
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Web of Science Categories records % of 37715 
GENETICS HEREDITY 14251 37.786 
PLANT SCIENCES 9688 25.687 
AGRONOMY 7003 18.568 
HORTICULTURE 4779 12.671 
BIOCHEMISTRY MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 3652 9.683 
BIOTECHNOLOGY APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 2934 7.779 
AGRICULTURE DAIRY ANIMAL SCIENCE 2437 6.462 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES 2367 6.276 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 1963 5.205 
ECOLOGY 1728 4.582 
ENDOCRINOLOGY METABOLISM 1009 2.675 
NEUROSCIENCES 986 2.614 
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 985 2.612 
CELL BIOLOGY 973 2.580 
AGRICULTURE MULTIDISCIPLINARY 839 2.225 
BIOLOGY 748 1.983 
FOOD SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY 607 1.609 
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISEASE 602 1.596 
PSYCHIATRY 584 1.548 
VETERINARY SCIENCES 555 1.472 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 518 1.373 
PHYSIOLOGY 460 1.220 
BIOCHEMICAL RESEARCH METHODS 428 1.135 
IMMUNOLOGY 424 1.124 
FORESTRY 415 1.100 
PHARMACOLOGY PHARMACY 395 1.047 
CHEMISTRY MULTIDISCIPLINARY 354 0.939 
ZOOLOGY 321 0.851 
MEDICINE RESEARCH EXPERIMENTAL 289 0.766 
ONCOLOGY 286 0.758 
CARDIAC CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS 275 0.729 
HEMATOLOGY 274 0.727 
PSYCHOLOGY MULTIDISCIPLINARY 268 0.711 
CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 254 0.673 
NUTRITION DIETETICS 244 0.647 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 214 0.567 
ENTOMOLOGY 192 0.509 
BIOPHYSICS 183 0.485 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 183 0.485 
MICROBIOLOGY 169 0.448 
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 132 0.350 
ANTHROPOLOGY 128 0.339 
TOXICOLOGY 124 0.329 
RHEUMATOLOGY 119 0.316 
CHEMISTRY ORGANIC 113 0.300 
UROLOGY NEPHROLOGY 108 0.286 
GASTROENTEROLOGY HEPATOLOGY 103 0.273 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 92 0.244 
PARASITOLOGY 90 0.239 
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 89 0.236 
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM 77 0.204 
PATHOLOGY 70 0.186 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 67 0.178 
MYCOLOGY 64 0.170 
VIROLOGY 61 0.162 
PSYCHOLOGY 47 0.125 
COMPUTER SCIENCE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS 44 0.117 
PSYCHOLOGY DEVELOPMENTAL 44 0.117 
MICROSCOPY 42 0.111 
PALEONTOLOGY 31 0.082 
DERMATOLOGY 30 0.080 
PSYCHOLOGY BIOLOGICAL 27 0.072 
ORNITHOLOGY 12 0.032 
PSYCHOLOGY SOCIAL 12 0.032 
NEUROIMAGING 11 0.029 
HISTORY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 9 0.024 
HUMANITIES MULTIDISCIPLINARY 7 0.019 
SOCIOLOGY 6 0.016 
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ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 5 0.013 
PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED 1 0.003 
 
 
Refined by: DOCUMENT TYPES: ( ARTICLE OR BOOK CHAPTER OR PROCEEDINGS PAPER OR REVIEW OR MEETING AB-
STRACT ) AND [excluding]WEB OF SCIENCE CATEGORIES: ( MEDICINE GENERAL INTERNAL OR CHEMISTRY ANALYTICAL 
OR OPTICS OR PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OR RADIOLOGY NUCLEAR MEDICINE MEDICAL IM-
AGING OR MATERIALS SCIENCE CHARACTERIZATION TESTING OR MARINE FRESHWATER BIOLOGY OR GERIATRICS 
GERONTOLOGY OR METALLURGY METALLURGICAL ENGINEERING OR COMPUTER SCIENCE THEORY METHODS OR 
COMPUTER SCIENCE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OR NANOSCIENCE NANOTECHNOLOGY OR FISHERIES OR MATERIALS 
SCIENCE MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR SPECTROSCOPY OR ENGINEERING BIOMEDICAL OR ENGINEERING MULTIDISCIPLI-
NARY OR PHYSICS CONDENSED MATTER OR ENGINEERING CHEMICAL OR MATERIALS SCIENCE COATINGS FILMS OR 
ENERGY FUELS OR MATHEMATICS APPLIED OR OCEANOGRAPHY OR CHEMISTRY PHYSICAL OR GEOSCIENCES MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY OR COMPUTER SCIENCE INFORMATION SYSTEMS OR PHYSICS MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR GEOCHEMISTRY 
GEOPHYSICS OR STATISTICS PROBABILITY OR ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENTAL OR CHEMISTRY APPLIED OR PHYSICS 
FLUIDS PLASMAS OR ENGINEERING MECHANICAL OR WATER RESOURCES OR PHYSICS APPLIED OR PHYSICS ATOMIC 
MOLECULAR CHEMICAL OR SOIL SCIENCE OR PHYSICS MATHEMATICAL OR ENGINEERING CIVIL OR POLYMER SCIENCE 
OR AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING OR INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTATION OR MECHANICS OR OBSTETRICS GYNECOL-
OGY OR ENGINEERING ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC OR OPHTHALMOLOGY ) AND [excluding]WEB OF SCIENCE CATEGO-
RIES: ( PEDIATRICS OR SPORT SCIENCES OR ASTRONOMY ASTROPHYSICS OR ORTHOPEDICS OR ALLERGY OR ANATOMY 
MORPHOLOGY OR CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE OR ECONOMICS OR CHEMISTRY MEDICINAL OR PSYCHOLOGY EXPERI-
MENTAL OR DENTISTRY ORAL SURGERY MEDICINE OR METEOROLOGY ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES OR SURGERY OR 
MATHEMATICS INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS OR GEOLOGY OR CRYSTALLOGRAPHY OR CHEMISTRY INORGANIC 
NUCLEAR OR PSYCHOLOGY CLINICAL OR TROPICAL MEDICINE OR EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH OR MATERI-
ALS SCIENCE CERAMICS OR MATHEMATICS OR AUDIOLOGY SPEECH LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY OR ELECTROCHEMISTRY 
OR MANAGEMENT OR MATERIALS SCIENCE COMPOSITES OR REHABILITATION OR MEDICAL LABORATORY TECHNOL-
OGY OR REMOTE SENSING OR OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY OR ANESTHESIOLOGY OR GREEN SUSTAINABLE SCIENCE 
TECHNOLOGY OR IMAGING SCIENCE PHOTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY OR PSYCHOLOGY EDUCATIONAL OR BUSINESS FI-
NANCE OR TRANSPLANTATION OR LINGUISTICS OR SOCIAL SCIENCES INTERDISCIPLINARY OR ENGINEERING GEOLOG-
ICAL OR GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL OR MINING MINERAL PROCESSING OR ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING OR NUCLEAR 
SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY OR BUSINESS OR EDUCATION SPECIAL OR LANGUAGE LINGUISTICS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE 
PAPER WOOD OR AUTOMATION CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PHYSICS PARTICLES FIELDS OR ACOUSTICS OR CELL TISSUE 
ENGINEERING OR MINERALOGY OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH MANAGEMENT SCIENCE OR ENGINEERING INDUSTRIAL 
OR PHYSICS NUCLEAR OR AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS POLICY OR ENGINEERING AEROSPACE OR GEOGRAPHY OR 
MEDICAL INFORMATICS OR MEDICINE LEGAL OR COMPUTER SCIENCE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING OR INTEGRATIVE 
COMPLEMENTARY MEDICINE OR MATERIALS SCIENCE BIOMATERIALS OR REGIONAL URBAN PLANNING OR HISTORY 
OR INFORMATION SCIENCE LIBRARY SCIENCE OR MATERIALS SCIENCE TEXTILES OR ROBOTICS OR SOCIAL SCIENCES 
MATHEMATICAL METHODS OR DEMOGRAPHY OR EDUCATION SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES OR TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE 
TECHNOLOGY OR ARCHAEOLOGY OR COMPUTER SCIENCE CYBERNETICS OR ENGINEERING PETROLEUM OR HEALTH 
CARE SCIENCES SERVICES OR NURSING OR AREA STUDIES OR COMPUTER SCIENCE HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE OR 
CONSTRUCTION BUILDING TECHNOLOGY OR HOSPITALITY LEISURE SPORT TOURISM OR SOCIAL ISSUES OR TRANSPOR-
TATION OR URBAN STUDIES OR CRIMINOLOGY PENOLOGY OR ENGINEERING MARINE OR ETHICS OR POLITICAL SCI-
ENCE OR TELECOMMUNICATIONS OR ANDROLOGY OR ARCHITECTURE OR ERGONOMICS OR LAW OR LIMNOLOGY OR 
LOGIC OR MEDICAL ETHICS OR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OR THERMODYNAMICS OR ART OR COMMUNICATION OR 
CULTURAL STUDIES OR EMERGENCY MEDICINE OR ENGINEERING OCEAN OR GERONTOLOGY OR HEALTH POLICY SER-
VICES OR MUSIC OR PSYCHOLOGY MATHEMATICAL ) 
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QUERY 2: TS=(“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*”) 
 
Results: 2,464 
Timespan: All years (1985-2019) 
Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI. 
 
 
Bar Graph 3: Query (“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*”) per year of publication 
 
 
 
 
Bar Graph 4: Query (“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*”) per research area 
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Web of Science Categories records % of 2464 
PLANT SCIENCES 459 18.628 
AGRONOMY 400 16.234 
HORTICULTURE 312 12.662 
GENETICS HEREDITY 240 9.740 
AGRICULTURE DAIRY ANIMAL SCIENCE 172 6.981 
AGRICULTURE MULTIDISCIPLINARY 154 6.250 
FOOD SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY 149 6.047 
ZOOLOGY 107 4.343 
VETERINARY SCIENCES 104 4.221 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES 92 3.734 
ECOLOGY 90 3.653 
BIOCHEMISTRY MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 84 3.409 
BIOTECHNOLOGY APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 82 3.328 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 76 3.084 
BIOLOGY 66 2.679 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 64 2.597 
FORESTRY 52 2.110 
CHEMISTRY MULTIDISCIPLINARY 44 1.786 
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 40 1.623 
PHARMACOLOGY PHARMACY 35 1.420 
NEUROSCIENCES 34 1.380 
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 29 1.177 
MEDICINE RESEARCH EXPERIMENTAL 28 1.136 
PSYCHOLOGY MULTIDISCIPLINARY 26 1.055 
NUTRITION DIETETICS 25 1.015 
ONCOLOGY 25 1.015 
PHILOSOPHY 25 1.015 
CARDIAC CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS 23 0.933 
CELL BIOLOGY 23 0.933 
MEDICINE GENERAL INTERNAL 23 0.933 
SOCIAL SCIENCES INTERDISCIPLINARY 23 0.933 
ENTOMOLOGY 22 0.893 
PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTAL 22 0.893 
IMMUNOLOGY 21 0.852 
PSYCHIATRY 20 0.812 
CHEMISTRY MEDICINAL 17 0.690 
CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 17 0.690 
ENDOCRINOLOGY METABOLISM 16 0.649 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 16 0.649 
OPHTHALMOLOGY 14 0.568 
PHYSIOLOGY 14 0.568 
ANTHROPOLOGY 13 0.528 
PALEONTOLOGY 13 0.528 
ANATOMY MORPHOLOGY 12 0.487 
BIOCHEMICAL RESEARCH METHODS 12 0.487 
GEOGRAPHY 12 0.487 
MICROBIOLOGY 12 0.487 
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISEASE 12 0.487 
PSYCHOLOGY 12 0.487 
BIOPHYSICS 11 0.446 
GASTROENTEROLOGY HEPATOLOGY 11 0.446 
MEDICINE LEGAL 11 0.446 
PSYCHOLOGY DEVELOPMENTAL 11 0.446 
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 9 0.365 
HUMANITIES MULTIDISCIPLINARY 9 0.365 
PSYCHOLOGY CLINICAL 9 0.365 
SOCIOLOGY 9 0.365 
PARASITOLOGY 8 0.325 
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 7 0.284 
GEOCHEMISTRY GEOPHYSICS 7 0.284 
GERONTOLOGY 7 0.284 
HISTORY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 7 0.284 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 7 0.284 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 6 0.244 
COMPUTER SCIENCE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS 6 0.244 
TOXICOLOGY 6 0.244 
CHEMISTRY ORGANIC 5 0.203 
PATHOLOGY 5 0.203 
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SOCIAL ISSUES 5 0.203 
ALLERGY 4 0.162 
DERMATOLOGY 4 0.162 
INTEGRATIVE COMPLEMENTARY MEDICINE 4 0.162 
MYCOLOGY 4 0.162 
ORNITHOLOGY 3 0.122 
PSYCHOLOGY BIOLOGICAL 3 0.122 
SOCIAL SCIENCES BIOMEDICAL 2 0.081 
FAMILY STUDIES 1 0.041 
PSYCHOLOGY SOCIAL 1 0.041 
 
 
Refined by: DOCUMENT TYPES: ( ARTICLE OR BOOK CHAPTER OR PROCEEDINGS PAPER OR REVIEW OR MEETING AB-
STRACT ) AND [excluding]WEB OF SCIENCE CATEGORIES: ( ENGINEERING MECHANICAL OR COMPUTER SCIENCE THEORY 
METHODS OR ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENTAL OR METEOROLOGY ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES OR BUSINESS OR ASTRON-
OMY ASTROPHYSICS OR AUTOMATION CONTROL SYSTEMS OR ENERGY FUELS OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH MANAGE-
MENT SCIENCE OR RADIOLOGY NUCLEAR MEDICINE MEDICAL IMAGING OR ENGINEERING MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR 
PHYSICS MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR CONSTRUCTION BUILDING TECHNOLOGY OR ECONOMICS OR MATHEMATICS INTER-
DISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS OR WATER RESOURCES OR ENGINEERING BIOMEDICAL OR INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMEN-
TATION OR PHYSICS FLUIDS PLASMAS OR MATHEMATICS APPLIED OR ENGINEERING ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC OR MA-
TERIALS SCIENCE MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR COMPUTER SCIENCE INFORMATION SYSTEMS OR PHYSICS MATHEMATICAL 
OR SOIL SCIENCE OR ENGINEERING INDUSTRIAL OR ENGINEERING CIVIL OR PHYSICS APPLIED OR MECHANICS OR SUR-
GERY OR EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH OR OPTICS OR PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OR 
CHEMISTRY PHYSICAL OR STATISTICS PROBABILITY OR NANOSCIENCE NANOTECHNOLOGY OR CHEMISTRY APPLIED 
OR PHYSICS ATOMIC MOLECULAR CHEMICAL OR TELECOMMUNICATIONS OR ENGINEERING CHEMICAL OR MARINE 
FRESHWATER BIOLOGY OR THERMODYNAMICS OR COMPUTER SCIENCE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OR METALLURGY 
METALLURGICAL ENGINEERING OR OCEANOGRAPHY OR CHEMISTRY ANALYTICAL OR POLYMER SCIENCE OR COM-
PUTER SCIENCE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING OR MANAGEMENT OR GEOSCIENCES MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR IMAGING SCI-
ENCE PHOTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY OR BUSINESS FINANCE OR PHYSICS CONDENSED MATTER OR SPECTROSCOPY OR 
AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING ) AND [excluding] WEB OF SCIENCE CATEGORIES: ( MATERIALS SCIENCE PAPER WOOD OR 
AREA STUDIES OR COMMUNICATION OR MATHEMATICS OR MICROSCOPY OR OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY OR ENGI-
NEERING AEROSPACE OR GERIATRICS GERONTOLOGY OR GREEN SUSTAINABLE SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY OR INFOR-
MATION SCIENCE LIBRARY SCIENCE OR LANGUAGE LINGUISTICS OR LAW OR MINING MINERAL PROCESSING OR AGRI-
CULTURAL ECONOMICS POLICY OR DENTISTRY ORAL SURGERY MEDICINE OR ELECTROCHEMISTRY OR HEMATOLOGY 
OR HOSPITALITY LEISURE SPORT TOURISM OR LINGUISTICS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE TEXTILES OR ORTHOPEDICS OR 
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM OR UROLOGY NEPHROLOGY OR MINERALOGY OR NUCLEAR SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY OR TRANS-
PORTATION SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY OR ENGINEERING GEOLOGICAL OR GEOLOGY OR HEALTH CARE SCIENCES SER-
VICES OR HISTORY OR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR PHYSICS NUCLEAR OR POLITICAL SCIENCE OR PSYCHOLOGY 
EDUCATIONAL OR CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE OR CRYSTALLOGRAPHY OR FISHERIES OR NURSING OR PHYSICS PARTI-
CLES FIELDS OR REMOTE SENSING OR SPORT SCIENCES OR ACOUSTICS OR ANESTHESIOLOGY OR ARCHAEOLOGY OR 
ART OR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES OR ETHICS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE CERAMICS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE CHARACTER-
IZATION TESTING OR MATERIALS SCIENCE COATINGS FILMS OR OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY OR REHABILITATION OR 
RHEUMATOLOGY OR SOCIAL WORK OR VIROLOGY OR ANDROLOGY OR AUDIOLOGY SPEECH LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 
OR CHEMISTRY INORGANIC NUCLEAR OR CRIMINOLOGY PENOLOGY OR EDUCATION SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES OR EN-
GINEERING MARINE OR INFECTIOUS DISEASES OR LIMNOLOGY OR MATERIALS SCIENCE BIOMATERIALS OR MATERI-
ALS SCIENCE COMPOSITES OR MEDICAL INFORMATICS OR MEDICAL LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY OR PEDIATRICS OR 
PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED OR REGIONAL URBAN PLANNING OR TRANSPLANTATION OR TRANSPORTATION OR URBAN 
STUDIES OR WOMEN S STUDIES OR ARCHITECTURE OR COMPUTER SCIENCE HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE OR CULTURAL 
STUDIES OR ENGINEERING PETROLEUM OR GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL OR LITERATURE OR MUSIC OR PLANNING DEVEL-
OPMENT OR TROPICAL MEDICINE ) 
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QUERY 3: TS=(“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*” OR "Mendelian trait*" OR 
"Mendelian character*" OR "Mendelian disease*") 
 
Results: 3,233 
Timespan: All years (1985-2019) 
Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI 
 
 
Bar Graph 5: Query (“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*” OR "Mendelian trait*" OR "Men-
delian character*" OR "Mendelian disease*") per year of publication 
 
 
 
 
Bar Graph 6: Query (“qualitative trait*” OR “qualitative character*” OR "Mendelian trait*" OR "Men-
delian character*" OR "Mendelian disease*") per research area 
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Web of Science Categories records % of 3233 
GENETICS HEREDITY 684 21.157 
PLANT SCIENCES 504 15.589 
AGRONOMY 423 13.084 
HORTICULTURE 334 10.331 
BIOCHEMISTRY MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 214 6.619 
AGRICULTURE DAIRY ANIMAL SCIENCE 182 5.629 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES 164 5.073 
BIOTECHNOLOGY APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 160 4.949 
AGRICULTURE MULTIDISCIPLINARY 155 4.794 
FOOD SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY 150 4.640 
VETERINARY SCIENCES 115 3.557 
ZOOLOGY 110 3.402 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 105 3.248 
ECOLOGY 101 3.124 
BIOLOGY 86 2.660 
CELL BIOLOGY 79 2.444 
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 73 2.258 
NEUROSCIENCES 70 2.165 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 67 2.072 
MEDICINE RESEARCH EXPERIMENTAL 65 2.011 
CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 59 1.825 
FORESTRY 56 1.732 
CHEMISTRY MULTIDISCIPLINARY 50 1.547 
PHARMACOLOGY PHARMACY 49 1.516 
CARDIAC CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS 45 1.392 
ONCOLOGY 43 1.330 
BIOCHEMICAL RESEARCH METHODS 41 1.268 
ENDOCRINOLOGY METABOLISM 38 1.175 
IMMUNOLOGY 37 1.144 
PSYCHIATRY 35 1.083 
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISEASE 33 1.021 
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 29 0.897 
NUTRITION DIETETICS 28 0.866 
PSYCHOLOGY MULTIDISCIPLINARY 26 0.804 
PHILOSOPHY 25 0.773 
ENTOMOLOGY 24 0.742 
SOCIAL SCIENCES INTERDISCIPLINARY 22 0.680 
TOXICOLOGY 22 0.680 
ANTHROPOLOGY 21 0.650 
PHYSIOLOGY 21 0.650 
BIOPHYSICS 19 0.588 
GASTROENTEROLOGY HEPATOLOGY 19 0.588 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 19 0.588 
DERMATOLOGY 18 0.557 
MICROBIOLOGY 18 0.557 
CHEMISTRY MEDICINAL 17 0.526 
HEMATOLOGY 16 0.495 
PATHOLOGY 15 0.464 
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 14 0.433 
PALEONTOLOGY 13 0.402 
ANATOMY MORPHOLOGY 12 0.371 
COMPUTER SCIENCE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS 9 0.278 
HUMANITIES MULTIDISCIPLINARY 9 0.278 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8 0.247 
HISTORY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 7 0.217 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 6 0.186 
CHEMISTRY ORGANIC 5 0.155 
PSYCHOLOGY DEVELOPMENTAL 5 0.155 
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM 5 0.155 
ORNITHOLOGY 4 0.124 
PSYCHOLOGY 4 0.124 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 3 0.093 
MEDICAL INFORMATICS 3 0.093 
VIROLOGY 3 0.093 
CELL TISSUE ENGINEERING 1 0.031 
FAMILY STUDIES 1 0.031 
PSYCHOLOGY BIOLOGICAL 1 0.031 
SOCIAL SCIENCES BIOMEDICAL 1 0.031 
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Refined by: DOCUMENT TYPES: ( ARTICLE OR PROCEEDINGS PAPER OR BOOK CHAPTER OR REVIEW OR MEETING AB-
STRACT ) AND [excluding]WEB OF SCIENCE CATEGORIES: ( MANAGEMENT OR GEOSCIENCES MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR 
PHYSICS ATOMIC MOLECULAR CHEMICAL OR BUSINESS FINANCE OR METALLURGY METALLURGICAL ENGINEERING 
OR AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING OR COMPUTER SCIENCE THEORY METHODS OR ENGINEERING BIOMEDICAL OR EN-
GINEERING MECHANICAL OR MEDICINE GENERAL INTERNAL OR PHYSICS CONDENSED MATTER OR STATISTICS PROB-
ABILITY OR PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTAL OR ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENTAL OR SURGERY OR BUSINESS OR METE-
OROLOGY ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES OR RADIOLOGY NUCLEAR MEDICINE MEDICAL IMAGING OR AUTOMATION CON-
TROL SYSTEMS OR ASTRONOMY ASTROPHYSICS OR ECONOMICS OR ENERGY FUELS OR MATHEMATICS INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY APPLICATIONS OR COMPUTER SCIENCE INFORMATION SYSTEMS OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH MANAGEMENT SCI-
ENCE OR ENGINEERING ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC OR OPHTHALMOLOGY OR MATERIALS SCIENCE MULTIDISCIPLI-
NARY OR ENGINEERING MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR CONSTRUCTION BUILDING TECHNOLOGY OR PHYSICS MULTIDISCI-
PLINARY OR PHYSICS FLUIDS PLASMAS OR MATHEMATICS APPLIED OR PHYSICS MATHEMATICAL OR PUBLIC ENVI-
RONMENTAL OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OR WATER RESOURCES OR PHYSICS APPLIED OR 
INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTATION OR ENGINEERING INDUSTRIAL OR EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH OR SOIL 
SCIENCE OR OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY OR CHEMISTRY PHYSICAL OR ENGINEERING CIVIL OR PEDIATRICS OR CHEM-
ISTRY APPLIED OR MECHANICS OR ENGINEERING CHEMICAL OR OPTICS OR CHEMISTRY ANALYTICAL OR MARINE 
FRESHWATER BIOLOGY OR COMPUTER SCIENCE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ) AND [excluding] WEB OF SCIENCE CATE-
GORIES: ( GEOGRAPHY OR POLYMER SCIENCE OR UROLOGY NEPHROLOGY OR SOCIOLOGY OR GERONTOLOGY OR MA-
TERIALS SCIENCE PAPER WOOD OR MEDICINE LEGAL OR RHEUMATOLOGY OR PSYCHOLOGY CLINICAL OR DENTISTRY 
ORAL SURGERY MEDICINE OR GEOCHEMISTRY GEOPHYSICS OR ALLERGY OR AREA STUDIES OR COMMUNICATION OR 
GERIATRICS GERONTOLOGY OR MATHEMATICS OR MEDICAL LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY OR MICROSCOPY OR PARA-
SITOLOGY OR ENGINEERING AEROSPACE OR INFORMATION SCIENCE LIBRARY SCIENCE OR LANGUAGE LINGUISTICS 
OR LAW OR MINING MINERAL PROCESSING OR ORTHOPEDICS OR AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS POLICY OR ELECTRO-
CHEMISTRY OR MATERIALS SCIENCE TEXTILES OR NUCLEAR SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY OR OCEANOGRAPHY OR REMOTE 
SENSING OR COMPUTER SCIENCE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING OR HOSPITALITY LEISURE SPORT TOURISM OR MINERAL-
OGY OR SOCIAL ISSUES OR TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY OR EDUCATION SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES OR EN-
GINEERING GEOLOGICAL OR GEOLOGY OR HEALTH CARE SCIENCES SERVICES OR HISTORY OR IMAGING SCIENCE PHO-
TOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY OR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR LINGUISTICS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE CHARACTERIZA-
TION TESTING OR OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY OR PHYSICS NUCLEAR OR POLITICAL SCIENCE OR PSYCHOLOGY SOCIAL 
OR CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE OR CRYSTALLOGRAPHY OR ETHICS OR FISHERIES OR INTEGRATIVE COMPLEMENTARY 
MEDICINE OR LIMNOLOGY OR MYCOLOGY OR NURSING OR PHYSICS PARTICLES FIELDS OR PSYCHOLOGY EDUCA-
TIONAL OR THERMODYNAMICS OR ACOUSTICS OR ANESTHESIOLOGY OR ARCHAEOLOGY OR ART OR DEVELOPMENT 
STUDIES OR GREEN SUSTAINABLE SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY OR HEALTH POLICY SERVICES OR MATERIALS SCIENCE BI-
OMATERIALS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE CERAMICS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE COATINGS FILMS OR MATERIALS SCIENCE 
COMPOSITES OR REHABILITATION OR SOCIAL WORK OR SPORT SCIENCES OR ANDROLOGY OR AUDIOLOGY SPEECH 
LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY OR CHEMISTRY INORGANIC NUCLEAR OR CRIMINOLOGY PENOLOGY OR ENGINEERING MA-
RINE OR PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED OR REGIONAL URBAN PLANNING OR SPECTROSCOPY OR TELECOMMUNICATIONS OR 
TRANSPLANTATION OR TRANSPORTATION OR WOMEN S STUDIES OR ARCHITECTURE OR COMPUTER SCIENCE HARD-
WARE ARCHITECTURE OR CULTURAL STUDIES OR ENGINEERING PETROLEUM OR GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL OR LITERA-
TURE OR MEDICAL ETHICS OR MUSIC OR NANOSCIENCE NANOTECHNOLOGY OR PLANNING DEVELOPMENT OR SOCIAL 
SCIENCES MATHEMATICAL METHODS OR TROPICAL MEDICINE OR URBAN STUDIES) 
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QUERY 4: TS=("quantitative trait*" AND "qualitative trait*" OR "quantitative character*" 
AND "qualitative character*") 
 
Results: 418 
Timespan: All years (1985-2019) 
Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI 
 
 
Bar Graph 7: Query ("quantitative trait*" AND "qualitative trait*" OR "quantitative character*" AND 
"qualitative character*") per year of publication 
 
 
 
 
Bar Graph 8: Query ("quantitative trait*" AND "qualitative trait*" OR "quantitative character*" AND 
"qualitative character*") per research area 
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Web of Science Categories records % of 418 
PLANT SCIENCES 137 32.775 
AGRONOMY 114 27.273 
GENETICS HEREDITY 106 25.359 
HORTICULTURE 61 14.593 
AGRICULTURE MULTIDISCIPLINARY 29 6.938 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 20 4.785 
BIOTECHNOLOGY APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 19 4.545 
AGRICULTURE DAIRY ANIMAL SCIENCE 16 3.828 
ZOOLOGY 16 3.828 
BIOCHEMISTRY MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 14 3.349 
ECOLOGY 14 3.349 
FORESTRY 14 3.349 
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 14 3.349 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES 14 3.349 
VETERINARY SCIENCES 10 2.392 
BIOLOGY 9 2.153 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 5 1.196 
FOOD SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY 5 1.196 
MEDICINE RESEARCH EXPERIMENTAL 4 0.957 
BIOCHEMICAL RESEARCH METHODS 3 0.718 
IMMUNOLOGY 3 0.718 
PHARMACOLOGY PHARMACY 3 0.718 
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 2 0.478 
BIOPHYSICS 2 0.478 
CHEMISTRY MULTIDISCIPLINARY 2 0.478 
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 2 0.478 
ENDOCRINOLOGY METABOLISM 2 0.478 
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISEASE 2 0.478 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 2 0.478 
ALLERGY 1 0.239 
ANTHROPOLOGY 1 0.239 
CARDIAC CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS 1 0.239 
CELL BIOLOGY 1 0.239 
CHEMISTRY MEDICINAL 1 0.239 
COMPUTER SCIENCE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS 1 0.239 
DERMATOLOGY 1 0.239 
ENTOMOLOGY 1 0.239 
GASTROENTEROLOGY HEPATOLOGY 1 0.239 
INTEGRATIVE COMPLEMENTARY MEDICINE 1 0.239 
MYCOLOGY 1 0.239 
NEUROSCIENCES 1 0.239 
NUTRITION DIETETICS 1 0.239 
PALEONTOLOGY 1 0.239 
PEDIATRICS 1 0.239 
PSYCHOLOGY SOCIAL 1 0.239 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 1 0.239 
 
 
Refined by: DOCUMENT TYPES: ( ARTICLE OR PROCEEDINGS PAPER OR REVIEW ) AND [excluding] WEB OF SCIENCE CATE-
GORIES: ( AUDIOLOGY SPEECH LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY OR INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTATION OR AUTOMATION CON-
TROL SYSTEMS OR MICROSCOPY OR BUSINESS FINANCE OR ORTHOPEDICS OR ACOUSTICS OR COMPUTER SCIENCE IN-
FORMATION SYSTEMS OR CONSTRUCTION BUILDING TECHNOLOGY OR CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE OR COMPUTER SCI-
ENCE THEORY METHODS OR EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH OR ENERGY FUELS OR ECONOMICS OR ENGINEER-
ING BIOMEDICAL OR ELECTROCHEMISTRY OR ENGINEERING CHEMICAL OR ENGINEERING CIVIL OR ENGINEERING ME-
CHANICAL OR ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENTAL OR GEOLOGY OR ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING OR GEOSCIENCES 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR ENGINEERING MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR STATISTICS PROBABILITY OR MATHEMATICS APPLIED 
OR MATERIALS SCIENCE MULTIDISCIPLINARY OR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OR AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING OR 
PHYSICS CONDENSED MATTER OR HOSPITALITY LEISURE SPORT TOURISM OR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OR IMAGING 
SCIENCE PHOTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY OR CHEMISTRY PHYSICAL OR SOCIOLOGY OR LANGUAGE LINGUISTICS OR 
MARINE FRESHWATER BIOLOGY OR SOIL SCIENCE OR LINGUISTICS OR SPECTROSCOPY OR MANAGEMENT OR OPH-
THALMOLOGY OR MATERIALS SCIENCE COATINGS FILMS OR PHYSICS APPLIED OR WATER RESOURCES OR MATHEMAT-
ICS INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS OR AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS POLICY OR MEDICINE GENERAL INTERNAL 
OR CHEMISTRY ANALYTICAL OR MINING MINERAL PROCESSING OR CHEMISTRY APPLIED OR ARCHAEOLOGY OR ENGI-
NEERING ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC OR AREA STUDIES OR FISHERIES ) AND [excluding] WEB OF SCIENCE CATEGORIES: ( 
OPTICS OR PARASITOLOGY OR PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OR RADIOLOGY NUCLEAR MEDI-
CINE MEDICAL IMAGING OR TRANSPLANTATION ) 
 
